

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO RECEIVE IN REAL EFFECT, WHICH BY THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF CALCULATES TO 2013 AS THE YEAR OF REARDON'S AUTOMATIC PAROLE ENTITLEMENT.

143. REARDON WOULD ALSO BE REGARDED NOW AS 'POLITICAL PRISONER BY DEFAULT', BECAUSE HE IS ONLY INCARCERATED NOW AS A DIRECT RESULT ^{OF} ~~THE~~ CHANGES IN SENTENCING LEGISLATION ([46.]), WHICH ILLEGALLY INCREASED PENALTY OF HIS SENTENCE BY STEALING (USING PARLIAMENT TO CREATE BILL [46.], THEN GOVERNOR TO ASSENT TO LEGISLATION), HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED (1993 SENTENCING STANDARDS OPERATIONAL EFFECT 'S. 12 SENTENCING ACT', 'REMISSIONS', 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE'), ACCRUED RIGHTS OWED TO HIM UPON SENTENCING (HAD THE TRUTH IN SENTENCING ACT [46.] NOT BEEN ENACTED), EVEN THOUGH PARLIAMENT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO 'INCREASE PENALTY OF SENTENCE', THAT IS ONLY VESTED IN THE SENTENCING COURT, BUT PARLIAMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT TOOK AWAY THOSE ACCRUED RIGHTS ANYWAY. THE BILL ([51.]), WAS CREATED AND PASSED BY BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES, POPULATED BY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND SENATE, MAKING IT A POLITICAL PROCESS, HENCE POLITICAL PRISONER BY DEFAULT. WHERE I AM A 'DIRECT POLITICAL PRISONER', DUE TO CURRENT MINISTERS STIPULATING IN WRITING (AS DESCRIBED ABOVE), THAT MY '2002 JUDGMENT [74.] DOES NOT ENTITLE ME TO REMISSIONS OR AUTOMATIC PAROLE', PRISONERS SUCH AS REARDON ARE 'POLITICAL PRISONERS BY DEFAULT', DUE TO ABOVE DESCRIBED REASONS. LIFERS WOULD NOT BE THE ONLY 'POLITICAL PRISONERS BY DEFAULT' OR 'DIRECT POLITICAL PRISONERS' (SUCH AS THOSE SENTENCED PRIOR TO 1-8-1994 ([46.]), IT WOULD INCLUDE MANY OTHER TYPES OF 'HISTORIC CRIMES' (INCLUDING ROBBERY, CHILD OFFENCES).

144. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PERMIT 'POLITICAL PRISONERS' TO BE CREATED, YET THAT IS WHAT REARDON, I AND OTHERS ARE... POLITICAL PRISONERS, ILLEGALLY INCARCERATED IN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES.

145. TO EASE THE ENTRY OF REARDON'S SENTENCING APPEALS (EVENT A AND EVENT B), INTO THE FULL COURT, SEEKING 1993 SENTENCING STANDARDS BE ~~THE~~ OPERATIONALLY APPLIED TO BOTH NON-PAROLE PERIODS IMPOSED UPON HIM IN 1995, WHICH WERE AT THAT TIME IMPOSED

IN LINE WITH 'CURRENT SENTENCING STANDARDS' [46.], BUT WHICH NOW ARE KNOWN TO BE THE WRONG SENTENCING STANDARDS, AS CLEARLY EVIDENCED IN THE REASONING IN MURPHY [72.] ("AT THE TIME THE CRIMES WERE COMMITTED."), AND QUALIFIED FURTHER IN MY 2002 JUDGMENT [77. AND 80.] ("THIS COURT MUST APPLY ... IN 1992."), REARDON WOULD BENEFIT FROM SUBMITTING A PETITION (CLCA s. 369), 'AGAINST SENTENCES' FIRST, RATHER THAN TECHNICAL CHALLENGE TO APPEAL COURT DIRECTLY.

146. THE SUPPORTING ARGUMENT FOR PETITION FIRST (AND IF THAT FAILS, THEN MOVE TO DIRECT APPEAL COURT CHALLENGE), INCLUDES THE OPPORTUNITY WITHIN PETITION DOCUMENT PROPER, TO EXPLAIN A LOT MORE IN FOUNDATION ARGUMENT SUPPORTING 'MERIT' AS THE ONLY REPLY FROM ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S INVESTIGATION OF PETITION ARGUMENT (WHICH A-G THEN FORWARDS TO GOVERNOR WITH OFFICIAL DETERMINATION, BEING 'REFERENCE TO THE FULL COURT'), WHEREAS STANDARD APPEAL FORMS DON'T REALLY PROVIDE FOR SUCH LENGTHY WRITTEN ARGUMENT, AND TO DRAW FROM THE REASON MY 2002 JUDGMENT WAS ACHIEVED, BEING A SIGNIFICANT JUDGMENT [50.].

147. AS DESCRIBED WITHIN MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], THE COURT MADE IT CLEAR THAT MURPHY [66.] AND MY APPEAL [74.], FOLLOWED THE RULING IN INGE [50.], WHICH BY THE DELIVERY OF INGE [50.], QUALIFIED THE REQUIRED 'MERIT' FOR MY FULL COURT HEARING. IT BOILS DOWN TO 'A SIGNIFICANT JUDGMENT' DELIVERED AFTER MY 1994 CCA HEARING, AND PARTICULARLY AS IT WAS DELIVERED BY THE HIGH COURT, WHICH VOIDS THE REASON BY WHICH THE DPP SOUGHT AND RECEIVED LEAVE, TO CHALLENGE AND INCREASE MY TRIAL SENTENCE (DPP ARGUED 'MANIFESTLY INADEQUATE BASED ON THE 'VON EINEM PRINCIPLE'), AND AS THE 'VON EINEN PRINCIPLE' WAS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT WHEN APPLYING WHAT THEY REGARDED AS APPLICABLE SENTENCING STANDARDS, WHICH WAS IN FACT ALSO PART OF CROWN'S ARGUMENT IN TRIAL SENTENCING SUBMISSIONS, ^{THAT} IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD ~~THAT~~ NO MATTER WHAT WAS IMPOSED BY THE SENTENCING COURT, WHETHER MY 1994 CCA JUDGMENT [75.], OR BOTH REARDON'S 1995 SENTENCES (ROBBERY EVENT, MURDER EVENT), THE SUBSEQUENT INGE JUDGMENT [50.], VOIDED THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 'VON EINEN PRINCIPLE' BEING APPLIED TO SAID CCA JUDGMENT, WHICH CAUSED THE FULL COURT IN 2002 TO CANCEL AND SET ASIDE MY 1994 CCA JUDGMENT [75.], AND DUE TO THE SAME

'VON EINEM PRINCIPLE' BEING ARGUED BY THE DPP IN SENTENCING SUBMISSIONS LEADING TO MY ORIGINAL SENTENCE, MEANT THAT THE FULL COURT IN 2002 [74.] WOULD CONSIDER MY NPP "AFRESH" AS FROM START POINT OF ORIGINAL SENTENCE (THEREFORE ENSURING MY NEW NPP WAS EFFECTIVELY SHORTER THAN ORIGINAL SENTENCE OF 19 YEARS, CALCULATING TO 2013 NPP ([75.])), PLUS THE COURT'S MANDATORY CONSIDERATION AND APPLICATION OF 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS, PLUS THE FACT THAT THE COURT WERE NOT AUTHORISED TO INCREASE MY ORIGINAL SENTENCE ([61.]), AS THE PETITION ITSELF WAS AGAINST THE 1994 CCA INCREASE FROM ORIGINAL SENTENCE (DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE APPEAL), AND SUBSEQUENTLY INCLUDED AGAINST ORIGINAL SENTENCE ALSO, DUE TO 'VON EINEM ARGUMENT' IN ORIGINAL SENTENCING SUBMISSIONS (BY THE DPP), WHICH EVENTUALLY ARRIVED AT A COURT'S NEW SENTENCE ([74.]), FOR MY IMPOSED NPP AS EXPRESSED IN THE STATE REPORTS [74., 80. AND 77.].

148. MY PETITION (APPEAL SENTENCE IMPOSED BY CCA), ACHIEVED MERIT THROUGH INGE [50.], DELIVERED IN 2002 [74.], BY THE FULL COURT.

149. REARDON'S PETITION (APPEAL SENTENCES IMPOSED IN 1995, FOR ROBBERY, AND MURDER), ACHIEVES MERIT THROUGH R v SMITH (1987) 44 SASR 587 [CITED AND APPLIED IN MURPHY [66.]], R v MURPHY [2002] SASC 299 ([66.]), AND R v JARRETT [2002] SASC 284 ([74.]). BOTH MURPHY AND JARRETT JUDGMENTS ARE THE SIGNIFICANT JUDGMENTS WHICH MUST BE ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNOR AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL (NOW), AFTER REARDON SUBMITS 'SENTENCING PETITION'. NOT ONLY MUST SAID PETITION BE GRANTED AND REFERRED TO THE FULL COURT (ON REFERENCE), THE FULL COURT MUST ALSO GRANT THE PETITION ARGUMENT, APPLY 1993 SENTENCING STANDARDS (INCLUDING CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, WHERE AUTOMATIC PAROLE AND REMISSIONS WERE OPERATIONALLY SOURCED AND SUBSEQUENTLY DELIVERED FROM), AND IMPOSE IN FULL WORDED DESCRIPTION REARDON'S RECALCULATED NPP AND AUTOMATIC PAROLE, BEING IN 2013, WHICH IS ALSO DESCRIBED ABOVE AS TO HOW AND WHY 2013 SHOULD BE REARDON'S RECALCULATED NPP, AND WITH 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' AS AN ENSHRINED RIGHT ALSO.

PAROLE FOR LIFERS

150. As PART OF THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON A LIFER BY THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT, WHEREIN A NON-PAROLE PERIOD HAS ALSO BEEN DETERMINED AND IMPOSED BY THE COURT, THE RESPECTIVE LIFER HAS THEREAFTER A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SUCH NPP DATE, WHICH HAS BEEN COMPETENTLY IMPOSED BY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORISED GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENT (THE JUDICATURE [3.]), BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WHILST THE GOVERNMENT ENFORCES, AS IT MUST DO, THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT [45.]. THIS MEANS THAT ONCE THE COURT HAS IMPOSED SENTENCE, PURSUANT TO, IN COMPLIANCE WITH (RELEVANTLY APPLICABLE SENTENCING LEGISLATION), AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANY ORDERS AND DIRECTIONS THE COURT INFORMS ITSELF OF (FOR EXAMPLE MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74. AND 80.]), THE HEAD-SENTENCE AND NON-PAROLE PERIOD CANNOT BE VARIED, EXCEPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SENTENCING ACT [45., 34., 36. AND 38.], WHICH MEANS ALSO THAT PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.]), AND GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), HAVE NO AUTHORITY WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION [1.], TO CREATE AND THEN EFFECT (ADMINISTRATIVELY), INTO ACTION ANY EVENT OR OTHER THINGS WHICH RESULTS, IN REAL TERMS, IN AN INCREASE TO THE NPP WHICH THE COURT IMPOSED UPON THE RESPECTIVE LIFER, DESCRIBED MORE IN ABOVE SECTION (TITLED 'ARGUMENT FOUNDATION').
151. AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND THEREFORE ILLEGAL (BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY PROHIBITED IN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION), ACTION AND EVENT WOULD INCLUDE SENTENCING ACT CHANGES ON 1-8-1994 [46.], WHICH THE STATE USES TO VOID 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE FOR LIFERS' ([125., 126., 127. AND 128.]), AFTER THE CRIMINAL SENTENCING COURT COMPETENTLY IMPOSED SUCH A RIGHT UPON THE RESPECTIVE LIFER AS PART OF SENTENCING (SENTENCE DELIVERED PRIOR TO 1-8-1994, SUCH AS MY TRIAL SENTENCE AND CCA SENTENCE [75.]), AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAUD BY EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND ILLEGAL POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT.
152. PRIOR TO 1-8-1994 [46.], THE COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE UPON A LIFER (WHERE NPP WAS ALSO IMPOSED), CONTAINED DIRECT OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF PAROLE APPROVAL, AS PAROLE COULD NOT BE DENIED TO THE LIFER, RE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' RIGHT. AS WELL AS THE ACCRUED RIGHT TO RECEIVE AUTOMATIC PAROLE, WAS THE RECOGNISED DATE OF THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD. DUE TO THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF THE REMISSIONS SYSTEM, AT THE POINT OF

DELIVERY OF THE COURT IMPOSED NON-PAROLE PERIOD (PURSUANT TO [45.]), UNDER SENTENCING STANDARDS PRIOR TO 1-8-1994 ([46.]), THE LIFER AND DPP AND DCS (DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), WOULD BE INFORMED (BY THE SENTENCE JUDGMENT ITSELF), OF THE LIFER'S NPP DATE (FOR THE SAKE OF EXAMPLE I'LL DESIGNATE A 21 YR NPP DATE).

153. With a COURT IMPOSED '21 YR NPP' (UNDER SENTENCING ACT), THEN GUARANTEE THE LIFER OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF REMISSIONS SYSTEM (OPERATING WITHIN CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT), MEANING THE EARLIEST RELEASE DATE (ERD) FOR THE LIFER WAS IN FACT 21 YRS MINUS ONE THIRD, CALCULATING TO 14 YRS AS THE EFFECTIVE NPP, THEREFORE LIFER HAD AUTOMATIC PAROLE SHORTLY AFTER 14 YRS, NOT COUNTING ANY INTERNAL PRISON PUNISHMENTS WHERE "MANAGER" COULD IMPOSE TIME PENALTY INCREASES, CONSEQUENTIALLY ADDED TO THE 14 YR NPP. THIS ~~CONTINUATION~~ CONDITION OF SHIFTING NPP WAS ENTIRELY DUE TO CONDUCT OF PRISONER, AND WAS PROMPTLY DEALT WITH BY PRISON MANAGEMENT EVERY MONTH, THERE WERE NO SECRET ~~MEETINGS~~ ^{MEETINGS} (SUCH AS WITH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (CABINET HEARINGS)), THE LIFER WAS GRANTED RIGHT TO SPEAK AND RIGHT TO BE HEARD AT SUCH MANAGER'S HEARINGS, AND IN THE EVENT SUCH LIFER DID RECEIVE A TIME PENALTY INCREASE TO THEIR NPP, THEREBY RECALCULATING THE ORIGINAL ~~REMISSIONS~~ NPP (21 YR + REMISSIONS (MINUS ONE THIRD) = 14 YRS NPP), TO ADD WHATEVER THE TIME PENALTY INCREASE WAS, AT THE NEW ERD THE LIFER WAS STILL ENTITLED TO AUTOMATIC PAROLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGED THIS ALSO.

154. IT ALSO MEANT THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT (OPERATING WITH CH II [3.] AUTHORITY), MUST RECOGNISE AND ENFORCE THE COURT'S NPP, AND ERD, AND ANY TIME ADDED TO COURT'S IMPOSED NPP (MINUS REMISSIONS), SUCH AS BY TIME PENALTY INCREASE, RESULTING IN REVISED ERD, UNDER THOSE PRE TRUTH IN SENTENCING ([46.]) STANDARDS.

155. PAROLE APPLICATIONS FOR LIFERS, UNDER THOSE SENTENCING STANDARDS, PRIOR TO OPERATION OF TRUTH IN SENTENCING ON 1-8-1994 ([46.]), WAS AN OPEN-BOOK EVENT BUT AFTER 1-8-1994 BECAME AN ADVERSARIAL, COMBATIVE, SECRET AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVENT ([16., 17. AND 28.]). AFTER 1-8-1994 ([46.]), THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, REGARDLESS OF WHICH POLITICAL PARTY HOLDS GOVERNMENT, WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO LIFERS APPLYING FOR PAROLE AND HOW SUCH ~~AND~~ PAROLE APPLICATIONS ARE PROCESSED, ENGAGED

IN AN OPERATIONAL PROCESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE FRAUD ([194. PARAGRAPH 64, 'CRAIG']);
ILLEGAL USE OF CSA (CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT), THROUGH PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS,
TO INCREASE LIFERS' NPP (IF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND GOVERNOR REFUSE TO GRANT PAROLE),
 THEREBY INCREASING PENALTY OF COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE RE NEW NPP, BUT IN BREACH OF
 DUE PROCESS AND LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENT; IMPROPER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF
'CONFLICTING SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION' IN A PROHIBITED MANNER, TO CONDUCT JUDICIAL
 REVIEWS OF MATTERS NOT LEGISLATIVELY OR CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORISED TO JUDICIALLY
 REVIEW, THEN IMPROPERLY EFFECT AN INCREASE TO LIFERS' COURT IMPOSED NPP FOLLOWING SAID
 JUDICIAL REVIEW (BY CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), WHERE SAID REVIEW DENIES PAROLE TO
 LIFER AND LIFER CAN'T REAPPLY FOR PAROLE AGAIN UNTIL A LATER DATE; UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE
OF CABINET TO UNDERTAKE SECRET HEARINGS RELATING TO LIFERS' PAROLE APPLICATION; ABUSING
CH. II CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY ([1. AND 3.]), TO HOLD SUCH SECRET CABINET HEARINGS ABOUT
 SUCH LIFER PAROLE APPLICATIONS, AND REFUSING TO UPHOLD THE LEGISLATIVELY PROTECTED RIGHTS
 OF LIFER DURING SUCH HEARINGS (INCLUDING [17., 87., 94., 84., 85., 112. AND 113.]); AND EVEN AFTER
 SUCH SECRET CABINET HEARINGS CONTINUING TO ILLEGALLY INCARCERATE SUCH LIFERS AS
 POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND IN DOING SO FURTHER DENYING THE LIFER FAIR AND HONEST
 JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION OF CABINET'S ACTIONS TO 'REVIEW PAROLE APPLICATION RATHER THAN
 PAROLE BOARD'S DECISION' ([100., 101. AND 102.]), WHICH IN LEGAL TERMS IS A JUDICIAL
 REVIEW BY NATURE AND INTENT AND EFFECT ([33. ("JUDICIAL BODY", "JUDICIAL OFFICER",
 "JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS")]).

156. THERE ARE MANY 'PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS' ABUSES PERPETRATED BY THE STATE
 GOVERNMENT, AGAINST LIFERS APPLYING FOR PAROLE, SOME ABUSES RELATE TO SPECIFIC DATE
 LIFER CAN APPLY FOR PAROLE (FIRST TIME, RE COURT IMPOSED NPP DATE), SOME ABUSES
RELATE TO LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN DATE PAROLE IS APPLIED FOR AND WHEN PAROLE
 DETERMINATION IS RECEIVED BACK FROM THE BOARD (SOMETIMES UP TO 3. YEARS), REGARDLESS
 OF IF GRANTED OR REFUSED, SOME ABUSES RELATE TO WHAT IS DONE TO THE APPLICATION AFTER
 THE BOARD RECOMMENDS PAROLE (I.E. GOVERNOR AND CABINET), SOME ABUSES RELATE TO USE OF
 'CONFLICTING LEGISLATION' TO DISRUPT LIFERS' PROCEDURAL RIGHTS, AND IN DOING SO DENYING
 LIFER FAIR AND LEGITIMATE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESSED, AND TO IN FACT
 BE GRANTED PAROLE, SOME ABUSES RELATE TO UNAUTHORISED AND UNLAWFUL USE OF CSA TO

CREATE 'POLITICAL PRISONERS', AND TO ILLEGALLY DENY THOSE 'POLITICAL PRISONERS' COMPETENT CRIMINAL COURT INVESTIGATION AS TO THE CREATION AND PERPETUITY OF THEIR INCARCERATION AS 'POLITICAL PRISONERS', AND SOME ABUSES RELATE TO THE STATE GOVERNMENT ILLEGALLY REFUSING TO ENFORCE THE COURT IMPOSED NPP, AND ALL RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS THEREIN AFFORDED BY SUCH COURT TO RESPECTIVE LIFER, AT DELIVERY OF IMPOSED SENTENCE (INCLUDING NON-PAROLE PERIOD), BY THE COMPETENT CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT.

157. NOT EVERY LIFER IS THE VICTIM OF STATE GOVERNMENT IMPROPRIETIES IN RELATION TO PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS, BUT MOST LIFERS ARE, AND IT DOESN'T MATTER IF THEY ARE 'PRISONER A' TYPE (SENTENCED (IN 2002 [74.J]) TO PRE-TRUTH IN SENTENCING STANDARDS, LIKE I WAS), 'PRISONER A' TYPE (SENTENCED (IN 1945, ABOVE DESCRIBED FURTHER), TO ~~THE~~ TRUTH IN SENTENCING STANDARDS, LIKE G. REARDON WAS), 'PRISONER B' TYPE (SENTENCED TO TRUTH IN SENTENCING STANDARDS, LIKE MURPHY WAS. [66.J]), 'PRISONER C' TYPE (SENTENCED PURSUANT TO INSERTION OF CSA ss. 67(7A), 67(7B), 67(7C)), AND EVEN UNDER THE NEW 'CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (PAROLE) AMENDMENT' PROPOSED BILL, THERE WILL BE NEWLY CREATED LIFER VICTIMS OF GOVERNMENT ABUSES, SOME OF WHOM WILL BE VICTIMS FOR THE SAME REASONS AS THOSE WHICH CURRENTLY EXIST ([140., 162., 174., 187., 85., 84. AND 194. (PARA. 11.)]), BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.J]), AND THE PARLIAMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (CH. I [3.J]), CONTINUE TO CREATE 'CONFLICTING LEGISLATION' AND 'BREACHEOUS LEGISLATION' ([28.J] (FAILING TO COMPLY WITH AND THEREFORE SHOULD NEVER HAVE RECEIVED ROYAL ASSENT [15.J])), DUE TO BEING BLIND TO THE FUNDAMENTAL INTRICACIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS (IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATE SENTENCING LAWS AND CORRECTIONS LEGISLATION), ACTS INTERPRETATION ACT ([13.J]) COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS, CRIMINAL LAW CONSOLIDATION ACT ([31.J]) COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS, CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING) ACT ([34.J]) COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT ([86.J]) COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS, HOW THEY SHOULD IN FACT OPERATE IN HARMONY WITH EACH OTHER TO EFFECT IMPOSITION OF A COMPETENT CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCE (BY THE CRIMINAL SENTENCING COURT (CH. III [3.J])), AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH SENTENCE (BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.J]), THROUGH CORRECTIONAL SERVICES AGENCIES AND OPERATION OF CSA), WHERE SUCH BLIND DISREGARD (BY STATE PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT), RESULTS IN CRIMES BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT BEING PERPETRATED AGAINST MANY LIFERS

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 WOULD INTEND TO, ARE IN THE PROCESS OF, OR HAVE ALREADY BEEN REFUSED PAROLE BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (REGARDLESS OF REASONS FOR REFUSAL).

158. IT MAY BE ARGUED BY THE STATE THAT NO MATTER HOW LIFERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN TREATED, VICTIMISED AND SUFFERED IN RELATION TO PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS, THERE ARE NEW PAROLE LAWS FOR LIFERS AND LIFERS SHOULD DISREGARD PREVIOUS ALLEGED IMPROPER/ UNLAWFUL/ UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS, DESCRIBED HEREIN AGAINST THE STATE GOVERNMENT, AND SIMPLY REAPPLY (OR APPLY FOR THE FIRST TIME), FOR PAROLE PURSUANT TO THE NEW PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS ([166., 167., 168., 169., 170., 171. AND 172.]). THAT WOULD BE THE STATE'S WAY OF DISMISSING CRIMES OF THE STATE, AGAINST SUCH LIFER VICTIMS, WHERE THE STATE PERPETRATED THE CRIMES (IT WAS IN FACT NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORISED TO ENGAGE IN, BUT DID ANYWAY), HAS NOW BEEN CAUGHT OUT FOR THEIR DESCRIBED (HEREIN), CONDUCT, AND EXPECTS US, THE LIFER VICTIMS, TO SHUT UP AND STOP COMPLAINING. THAT WOULD BE LIKE A CHILD SEX OFFENCE PERPETRATOR TELLING THEIR VICTIM AND POLICE, TO PISS-OFF AND STOP COMPLAINING ABOUT BEING A VICTIM (THE CHILD), BECAUSE THE CHILD IS STILL ALIVE AND THE CHILD SHOULD JUST GET OVER IT AND GET ON WITH THEIR LIFE... HOW FLIPPANT...!

159. IT DOES NOT MATTER WHY THE RESPECTIVE LIFERS ARE SENTENCED TO 'LIFE', WITH A NPP ALSO IMPOSED, THE FACT IS THAT THERE ARE SPECIFIC RIGHTS OWED TO SUCH LIFERS BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (OPERATING WITHIN AND OBLIGATED UNDER CH. II [3.]), WHILST THE STATE ENFORCES THE COURT DETERMINED AND IMPOSED SENTENCE. WHERE THE STATE GOVERNMENT FAILS TO, NEGLECTS TO OR REFUSES TO ENABLE AND EFFECT INTO OPERATION, ALL RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS OWED TO RESPECTIVE LIFERS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIFICALLY DETERMINED SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON EACH LIFER, INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC SENTENCING STANDARDS THAT MUST ALSO BE ENFORCED (BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT), ESPECIALLY RIGHTS OWED TO LIFER RELATING TO NPP, WHEN LIFER CAN APPLY FOR PAROLE, HOW SUCH PAROLE APPLICATION MUST BE PROCESSED (ACCORDING TO CONSTITUTIONAL [1. AND 3.], CRIMINAL LAW AND SENTENCING LAW COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS), THEN SUCH A LIFER IS THE VICTIM OF CONDUCT BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS PROHIBITED IN LAW. THAT WHICH IS DONE BY THE STATE WHICH IS OUTSIDE CONSTITUTIONAL ([1. AND 3.]) AUTHORISATION TO DO, WITHIN SPECIFICALLY DEFINED JURISDICTIONAL CONSTRAINTS (EXAMPLE STATE ~~GOVERNMENT~~ GOVERNMENT OPERATING WITHIN CH. II. [3.]), AND WHICH CAUSES HARM TO A PERSON WHERE THE HARM CAUSED IS NOT

AS A RESULT OF A LAWFULLY PERFORMED ACT (AN ACT DONE OUTSIDE JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY IS AN UNAUTHORISED ACT, AND MAY ALSO BE AN ILLEGAL ACT), THEN THE STATE GOVERNMENT MUST LEASE SUCH ACT AGAINST THE RESPECTIVE LIFER/S, AND UNDERTAKE ONLY ACTIONS WHICH THEY ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORISED ([1.]) TO ENGAGE IN AND EFFECT.

100. THERE ARE SEVERAL VERY SIGNIFICANT LEGAL DEFINITIONS, LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS, LEGAL UNDERTAKINGS AND ACTIONS (PROCESSES), WHICH SHOULD BE KNOWN AND APPRECIATED IN ORDER TO ACCEPT MERIT JUSTIFIABILITY OF THESE (HEREIN DESCRIBED), POINTS OF CONTENTION. SOME OF THESE ARE BRIEFLY HIGHLIGHTED AS FOLLOWS:

101. 1. THE PROCESS OF PREPARING PAROLE APPLICATION (BY PRISONER), IS A LEGAL PROCESS, AND ALL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PRISONER AS PART OF PAROLE APPLICATION SUBMISSION, ARE LEGAL DOCUMENTS. [113.]
102. 2. THE PROCESS OF PREPARING PAROLE APPLICATION DOCUMENTS (BY CORRECTIONS STAFF AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES), FORMS AND MUST THEREAFTER BE ACCEPTED, AS 'KNOWN STATE'S EVIDENCE', IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF PARTICULARS THEREIN DESCRIBED.
103. 3. EVERY ACTION BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, IN ANY WAY RELATING TO ~~2~~ LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, IS DONE WITHIN THE EMBODIMENT OF A "LEGAL PROCEEDING" [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, AND 24.]. [113.]
104. 4. THE PAROLE BOARD SITS AS A "JUDICIAL BODY", FOR THE LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS. [33.]
105. 5. ALL PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS PARTICIPATING IN RESPECTIVE LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS, DO SO AS "JUDICIAL OFFICERS" OF THE JUDICIAL BODY, AND THIS INCLUDES ALL SUBORDINATES OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING PRIVATE PRISON STAFF), WHO ACT ON BEHALF OF, AND ASSIST IN THE PREPARATION OF AND INVESTIGATION OF DOCUMENTATION AND PARTICULARS RELATING TO SAME, FOR USE AND CONSIDERATION BY THE PAROLE BOARD IN RELATION TO A SPECIFIC LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION TO THE PAROLE BOARD. [33.]
106. 6. THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF A LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, INCLUDING ¹ WHEN THE LIFER IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1. AND 3.]), RIGHTED TO APPLY FOR, RECEIVE AND GRANTED PAROLE FROM (DATE), IS A "JUDICIAL PROCEEDING" [33.], AND A ~~LEGAL~~

'LEGAL PROCEEDING' [113.], AND IS 'REPRESENTABLE' AT EVERY STAGE OF THE PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS, AFTER THE PAROLE BOARD HAS RECEIVED LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, ON BEHALF OF THE LIFER APPLICANT, BY A "LEGAL PRACTITIONER" [113.].

167. 7. THE PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS, FROM THE STATE GOVERNMENT'S PERSPECTIVE, AT THE FORMAL APPLICATION PHASE, IS FROM THE MOMENT THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVE (SUCH AS PRIVATE PRISON STAFF), RECEIVE THE LIFER APPLICANT'S WRITTEN PAROLE APPLICATION (SUBMISSION), UNTIL AND INCLUDING THE STATE GOVERNMENT'S WRITTEN NOTIFICATION (OF GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO GRANT OR REFUSE PAROLE), IS FORWARDED TO LIFER APPLICANT. THE PAROLE APPLICATION (FROM LIFER), IS IN THE PROCESSING PHASE FROM 'SUBMISSION' TO 'DECISION', AND IS A JUDICIAL PROCESS BY A JUDICIAL BODY, AND CONSTITUTES A LEGAL PROCEEDING.
168. 8. IT IS A MISUSE OF WORDING AND CREATION OF A FALSE BELIEF BY THE STATE, TO SUGGEST AND IMPLY THE GOVERNOR ACTUALLY MAKES ANY DECISION ABOUT LIFER'S PAROLE SUITABILITY, THE DECISION IS MADE IN AND BY CABINET (AFTER PAROLE BOARD "RECOMMENDS" PAROLE THEN ON-SENDS THE RECOMMENDATION TO GOVERNOR AND/OR MINISTER AND/OR CABINET), AND IS THEREFORE PURELY A POLITICAL DECISION (IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER PAROLE IS GRANTED ~~OR~~ OR NOT), [144. (PARA. 61.)].
169. 9. AFTER THE GOVERNOR/CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL RECEIVE THE PAROLE BOARD'S 'RECOMMENDATION' FOR PAROLE, REGARDING A SPECIFIC LIFER 'PAROLE APPLICANT', THE PAROLE APPLICATION (BY PRISONER), IS STILL WITHIN THE PROCESSING PHASE, IS STILL FORM OF A LEGAL PROCEEDING, AND A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING, AND REPRESENTABLE (BY STATUTORY RIGHT AT STATE HEARINGS), BY A LEGAL PRACTITIONER REPRESENTING THE LIFER APPLICANT, [113.].
170. 10. FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD (AFTER PAROLE BOARD 'RECOMMENDS PAROLE'), AFTER RECEIPT OF PAROLE BOARD'S DOCUMENTATION, FORMING SUBMISSION OF PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER APPLICANT ([94.]), TOGETHER WITH PAROLE BOARD'S ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION RELATING TO SAME, NOT ONLY IS THE LIFER APPLICANT'S PAROLE APPLICATION STILL

WITHIN THE PROCESSING PHASE, AND STILL A MATTER BEFORE THE PAROLE BOARD (L 94. AND 110, 112, AND 113. J), AND STILL A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING, AND STILL A LEGAL PROCEEDING, AND STILL 'REPRESENTABLE' (ON BEHALF OF LIFER APPLICANT), BY A "LEGAL PRACTITIONER" (L 112. AND 113. J), THE 'GOVERNOR IN CABINET' AND 'THE CABINET' AND 'EXECUTIVE COUNCIL' RECEIVING THE PAROLE BOARD'S SAID DOCUMENTATION, ALL NOW SIT AS A JUDICIAL BODY (FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF 'CONSIDERING' LIFER APPLICANT'S PAROLE SUITABILITY, THEN MAKES 'DETERMINATION' ACCORDINGLY), ENGAGING IN A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND A 'LEGAL PROCEEDING', AND A 'REPRESENTABLE' PROCEEDING (L 112. AND 113 J). THEY'VE DONE THAT SINCE 1-8-1994 (L 46. J)

171. 11. STATE LEGISLATION WHICH SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT FRAUDULENTLY USES TO EFFECT CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO RECEIVE AND CONSIDER LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION ELIGIBILITY, IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED AND IS THEREFORE DONE SO ILLEGALLY, PAROLE BOARD UNSENDING ITS 'DECISION' FOR 'EXECUTIVE REVIEW'.
172. 12. THE LEGISLATION SO USED (IN FACT MISUSED), BY THE GOVERNMENT TO ENGAGE IN 'PAROLE APPLICATION ELIGIBILITY' (BASICALLY, THEY ACTUALLY PERFORM THE EXACT SAME ACT AS THE PAROLE BOARD WHICH IS TO RECEIVE, TO CONSIDER, TO DETERMINE 'PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER'), IS FRAUDULENTLY ACTIONED TO ENGAGE IN SUCH PAROLE APPLICATION ASSESSMENT, BECAUSE CSA STIPULATES ONLY THAT THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION IS TO BE REVIEWED 'BY GOVERNOR', NOT THE ACTUAL PAROLE APPLICATION ITSELF, ONLY THE DECISION OF THE BOARD (TO RECOMMEND PAROLE), THEREFORE THERE IS NO JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT FORMAL REVIEW OF PAROLE APPLICATION AS IF IT WAS THE PAROLE BOARD, JURISDICTION LIES ONLY IN A 'JUDICIAL BODY REVIEW' (JUDICIAL REVIEW), OF THE PAROLE BOARD'S DECISION.
173. 13. ILLEGAL USE OF CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL/GOVERNOR, TO EFFECT THE RE-SENTENCING OF A LIFER WHO IS REFUSED PAROLE BY SAME, IN VIOLATION OF SENTENCING ACT ~~PROCEED~~ PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, AND INCREASING LIFER'S NPP AS A RESULT.
174. 14. FRAUDULENT USE OF CSA TO ENGAGE IN AND EFFECT ILLEGALLY PERFORMED RE-SENTENCING OF LIFER PAROLE APPLICANT, AND OPERATIONALLY INCREASE SUCH NPP.

175. 15. CREATION AND FRAUDULENT ASSENT INTO LEGISLATION (CSA), AMENDMENTS WHICH VIOLATE CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS (AIA [28.]), THEN OPERATIONALLY USED TO CAUSE DETRIMENT TO LIFERS, AND DONE SO WITHOUT TRUE AND PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION TO PERFORM AN ACTION, INCLUDING 'JUDICIAL REVIEW TO RE-SENTENCE LIFER', 'PARLIAMENT USED TO RE-SENTENCE LIFER', 'SECRET HEARING FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW WHERE MAJOR PARTY IS DENIED RIGHT TO SPEAK, BE HEARD, OR EVEN KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WAS SAID WITHIN, INCLUDING WHAT EVIDENCE WAS USED', 'CONFLICTING LEGISLATION', 'FALSE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION CLAIMED WITHIN AMENDMENTS BUT IN LACK OF IN REAL TERMS (AS DEFINED BY CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION [1. AND 3.]). WHERE THE PARLIAMENT/SENATE PASSES CSA AMENDMENTS, WHICH IN THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFECT PERFORM AN ACT WHICH IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, WHERE RULES OF LEGISLATION CREATION ACTUALLY PROHIBIT SUCH PROPOSED OPERATION/ACTION, THEN SUCH AMENDMENTS ARE IMPROPERLY PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT. WHERE ROYAL ASSENT IS OBTAINED FOR LEGISLATING CSA AMENDMENT BILL/S, WHICH IN THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFECT PERFORM AN ACT WHICH IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, WHERE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION ([28.]), MANDATE THE NON-ASSENT OF SUCH PROPOSED BILL/S, AND WHEREBY THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT ([29.]), IN FACT PROVIDES THE GOVERNOR WITH ERRONEOUS ADVICE AS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), COMPLIANCE OF SAME, THEN ROYAL ASSENT HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY OBTAINED, FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED AND MUST BE PROMPTLY EXPUNGED FROM THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT ([16. AND 17.]).
176. 16. THE COURT WAS WRONG IN WATSON ([194. (PARA. 103.)]), TO STATE AS IF FACT, THAT THE GOVERNOR (INDEPENDENT FROM CABINET), AND THE CABINET (INCLUDING GOVERNOR IN CABINET), HAVE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTIONAL ENTITLEMENT, TO PERFORM ANY ACTION (REGARDING LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION WHICH THE PAROLE BOARD 'RECOMMENDED' FOR PAROLE), OTHER THAN A PSUEPO-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BOARD'S DECISION ("RECOMMENDATION" [100., 101., 103.]), BEING A JUDICIAL REVIEW BY A JUDICIAL BODY OF A DECISION ("RECOMMENDATION"), BY A GOVERNMENT PERSON/ENTITY (THE PAROLE BOARD). THAT IS WHAT THE

CABINET (WITH GOVERNOR IN CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), PURPORTEDLY IS PERMITTED TO PURSUE (ENGAGE IN), AFTER RECEIVING PAROLE BOARD'S 'DECISION' TO RECOMMEND PAROLE TO SPECIFIC LIFER ([101.]) (AFTER AUGUST 2012 [102., 103., 104. AND 105.]). THERE IS NOTHING IN POSITIVE/AFFIRMATIVE WORDING IN [101.] WHICH PERMITS OR JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORIZES ANY OTHER PERSON/S (SUCH AS GOVERNOR, CABINET OR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), TO VETO THE PAROLE BOARD'S 'DECISION' AND THEN OVERTURN THE BOARD'S 'DECISION' TO RECOMMEND PAROLE ([64. (PARAS. 94. AND ~~117.~~) 117.]). THERE IS NOTHING IN POSITIVE/AFFIRMATIVE WORDING WITHIN THE 2012 AMENDMENTS [102.] WHICH PERMITS OR JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORIZES ANY OTHER PERSON/S (INCLUDING GOVERNOR, CABINET AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), TO VETO THE PAROLE BOARD'S 'DECISION' AND THEN OVERTURN THE BOARD'S 'DECISION' TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE', AND THEN NOT ONLY OVERTURN BOARD'S 'DECISION' BUT ALSO CONSEQUENTIALLY 'REFUSE' THE ENTIRE PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER APPLICANT (EVEN THOUGH THEY STARTED BY ONLY INVESTIGATING THE 'BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION').... WORDING ([103.]) STATES "IF GOVERNOR DOES NOT APPROVE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD".... IN WHICH CASE ONLY THE BOARD'S DECISION ("RECOMMENDATION"), HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED AND THEREFORE SHOULD IN FACT BE RETURNED TO THE PAROLE BOARD FOR RECONSIDERATION.... WORDING ([103.]) DOES NOT STIPULATE IN ANY WAY THAT "IF GOVERNOR DOES NOT APPROVE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD" THEN THE WHOLE PAROLE APPLICATION MUST TO ~~BE~~ 'REFUSED' CONSEQUENTIALLY'.... IF THE CLAIMED ACT WHICH THE GOVERNOR AND/OR GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO UNDERTAKE/ENGAGE IN/EFFECT, OR IN FACT HAS ALREADY BEEN UNDERTAKEN/ENGAGED IN/EFFECTED INTO OPERATION AND PERFORMED, IS NOT POSITIVELY AND AFFIRMATIVELY WORDED WITHIN LEGISLATION TO SO ACT, THEN SAID ACT SOUGHT TO BE DONE, OR HAVING ALREADY BEEN DONE, IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]) APPROVED OR PERMITTED AND SO MUST NOT BE DONE, AND IF ALREADY DONE THEN MUST BE REVERSED (IN ITS OPERATIONAL EFFECT), AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

177. 17. THE CSA PART 6, DOES NOT GIVE ANY RIGHT OR ENTITLEMENT, WITH SPECIFIC AFFIRMATIVE WORDING, TO GOVERNOR, CABINET OR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, TO "VETO"

OUTRIGHT AND THEN OVERTURN THE PAROLE BOARD'S FORMAL DECISION, WHICH IS TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE'. STATUTORY WORDS ONLY PERMITS THE GOVERNOR TO "NOT APPROVE" [103.] THE "BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION" [101.] OR "NOT APPROVE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD" [103.] (WHICH WAS INSERTED IN 2012 [102.], WELL AFTER WATSON [194.]). CSA DOES NOT IMPART ANY AUTHORITY AT ALL IN ANY WORDING, WHICH IN FACT WOULD CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] BE REQUIRED TO BE WRITTEN, IN CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS SPECIFIC DETAILS (AS STATED IN SELLECK [64. (PARAS. 74, 117.)]), THE OPERATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION OF FIRST... 'NOT APPROVE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION', THEN, SECOND... 'AFTER NOT APPROVING BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION TO THEN REVERSE THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION', THEN, THIRD... 'CONSEQUENTIALLY REFUSE/REJECT ENTIRE PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER'. THERE DOES NOT EXIST (IN LEGISLATION), THE 'ALTERNATIVE DECISION' TO [101.] "THE GOVERNOR MAY" ([30.]), FROM 1-8-1944 ([46.]) TO 2012 ([102.]), SO UNTIL INSERTION OF [102.], MORESO [103.], THERE WAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY WRITTEN (AS) OR HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), OR GOVERNOR (CSA OR [29.]), TO 'NOT ACCEPT OR APPROVE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION', REGARDLESS OF [30.] DUE TO LACK OF ALTERNATIVE DECISION MECHANISM. FOLLOWING [102. AND 103.], GOVERNMENT HAD EFFECTED THE ALTERNATIVE DECISION MECHANISM, SO BY THE WORDING OF [103.] "67(7A) ... DUES NOT APPROVE", THE GOVERNMENT HAD WHAT IT CONSIDERED TO BE AUTHORITY TO 'NOT APPROVE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION', WRITTEN IN LEGISLATION NOW, HOWEVER, IT STILL HAD NO CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY VIA CSA, AFTER EFFECTING [100.], TO 'VOID BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION OUTRIGHT AND CONSEQUENTIALLY REFUSE LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION'.

173.

18. CSA s. 67(7A) IS A 'MULTI-FACETED CONFLICTING SUB-SECTION', WHICH PURPORTS OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY TO FIRST... 'REFUSE PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER' (BUT DOES SO WITH NO ACTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO SO ACT), THEN, SECOND... 'EXTENDS LIFER'S NPP DATE BY UP TO ONE YEAR' ([103. AND 104.]) (BUT DOES SO WITH NO ACTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO SO ACT), THEN, THIRD... 'UNLAWFULLY HOLDS SECRET HEARINGS ABOUT PAROLE APPLICATIONS FROM LIFERS, IN-CABINET, WHICH LIFER IS ILLEGALLY DENIED LEGAL REPRESENTATION WITHIN ([110., 112. AND 113.]), AND ILLEGALLY REFUSE 'DISCLOSURE' (RULES OF EVIDENCE), OF STATE'S EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT SUCH SECRET HEARINGS (IN-CABINET), WHICH ARE IN FACT ONLY LEGISLATIVELY APPROVED TO CONDUCT A REVIEW OF BOARD'S DECISION, THOUGH I CHALLENGE THE GOVERNOR'S ASSENT OF THAT TOO,

BUT NOT OUTRIGHT REVIEW AND THEN REFUSAL/REJECTION OF LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION (WHICH IN FACT IS STILL CONSTITUTIONALLY VESTED IN THE PAROLE BOARD ONLY), EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNOR AND COURTS STILL FRAUDULENTLY (WATSON [144. (PARA. 64.)]), OPERATE THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY INTENTIONALLY, BUT CERTAINLY INEPTLY AND ERRONEOUSLY, UNDER THE FALSE CLAIM ABOUT THE TRUE JURISDICTION OF THE GOVERNOR AND OF THE GOVERNMENT (CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), AFTER PAROLE BOARD DELIVERS ITS 'RECOMMENDATION' [100.], WHICH PER WORDED DESCRIPTION (AND FOLLOWING THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL'S ARGUMENT IN WATSON [144. (PARA. 133. "... THE ABSENCE OF SUCH EXPRESS [WORDING TO POSITIVELY INDICATE ANY OTHER ACTION THAN 'APPROVE' OR 'NOT APPROVE' BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION ONLY], LEGISLATIVE INTENTION..."]], IS POSITIVELY WORDED AS ONLY BEING TO 'APPROVE' OR 'NOT APPROVE' THE ACTUAL RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD, NOT THE PAROLE APPLICATION ITSELF.

174. 19. SINCE 1-8-1994 ([46.]), UP TO 1-11-2015, THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ENABLED GOVERNOR, CABINET AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO CREATE VIA FORMAL DISCUSSION, POLITICAL PRISONERS (WHERE THEY REFUSED PAROLE TO LIFER), WHICH IS THE RESULT OF MP'S (THE GOVERNMENT), 'REFUSING TO GRANT PAROLE, EVEN THOUGH THE VESTED BODY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION (THE PAROLE BOARD ONLY, PER POSITIVE WORDING IN LEGISLATION ([94.])), HAS ALREADY RECOMMENDED PAROLE FOR THE LIFER'. WHERE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ACT TO CREATE LEGISLATION, THROUGH PASSING OF BILLS, WHICH IN ITS OPERATIONAL EFFECT ACTS OUTSIDE THE LIMITS AND JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY OF THE SENTENCING ACT [34.], TO INCARCERATE OR CONTINUE INCARCERATION OF A LIFER, AND SUCH INCARCERATION OCCURS OUTSIDE OPERATION OF THE SENTENCING ACT [34. AND 45.], THEN SUCH LIFER IS A POLITICAL PRISONER (UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED BY FRAUDULENT LEGISLATION, WHICH VIOLATES [28.]). WHERE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AS THE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), ACT TO CREATE A FORMAL DECISION, THROUGH CABINET HEARINGS/DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO A SPECIFIC LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION, WHICH IN ITS EFFECT RESULTS DIRECTLY IN THE CONTINUATION OF INCARCERATION OF A LIFER (PAROLE APPLICANT), AND IN SUCH OPERATIONAL EFFECT THEREBY ACTING (ARBITRARILY ALSO [64. (PARA. 117.)]), OUTSIDE THE LIMITS

AND JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY OF THE SENTENCING ACT [34.], TO CONTINUE INCARCERATION OF A LIFER, AND SUCH CONTINUING INCARCERATION OCCURS OUTSIDE OPERATION OF THE SENTENCING ACT [34. AND 45.], THEN THE LIFER IS A POLITICAL PRISONER (UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED BY UNAUTHORISED ACT, PERPETRATED WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENT ([1.]), BY THE GOVERNMENT OPERATING UNDER CH. II ([3.]) AUTHORITY.

180. 20. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION [1.], DOES NOT PERMIT SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT ([3.]) OR THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ([3.]), TO CREATE BY NATURE OF ACTION, A 'POLITICAL PRISONER' (WHERE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE 'DUE PROCESS', SUCH AS OPERATION OF SENTENCING ACT [45.], PLAYS NO PART IN THE ILLEGAL SENTENCE IMPOSED ON SUCH POLITICAL PRISONER (LIFER WHO IS DENIED PAROLE BY PAROLE BOARD OR BY GOVERNOR / CABINET / EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), AND WHERE NO CRIMINAL LAW COURT WAS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED IN THE 'SENTENCING OF SUCH PRISONER (OF UP TO 12. MONTHS AS A MINIMUM SENTENCE, AND THE ONLY UPPER LIMIT OF SUCH ILLEGAL SENTENCING OF THE POLITICAL PRISONER IS WHEN POLITICAL PRISONER DIES)). HOWEVER, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PRISONS CURRENTLY HOLD MORE THAN 30 LIFERS, WHO HAVE NOT ONLY BEEN ILLEGALLY SENTENCED AND HELD IN STATE PRISONS, THEIR 'ILLEGAL SENTENCING' AND 'ILLEGAL INCARCERATION' IS CONSTITUTIONALLY AND STATE LEGISLATIVELY PROHIBITED.
181. 21. THERE IS NO AUTHORITY HELD BY THE GOVERNOR, CABINET / EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO HEAR (RECEIVE), AND DECIDE ON ANY LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, THAT AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION, PER LEGISLATED STIPULATION LIES SOLELY WITH THE PAROLE BOARD, YET THE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), BEING CABINET (INCLUDING GOVERNOR IN CABINET), AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL HAS REPEATEDLY OPERATED WELL OUTSIDE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL [1. AND 3.] JURISDICTION, AND STATE LEGISLATED JURISDICTION, AND CONTRARY TO ARGUMENT SUBMITTED BY SOLICITOR-GENERAL IN WATSON [SUB-PARAGRAPH '18' ABOVE], WHERE 'THE ABSENCE OF SUCH EXPRESS WORDING IN LEGISLATION MEANS NO LEGISLATIVE INTENTION EXISTS', AND THEN ILLEGALLY REFUSED PAROLE APPLICATION ITSELF (FROM LIFER). NO AUTHORITY TO SO ACT (BY GOVERNMENT (CABINET / EXECUTIVE COUNCIL) AND GOVERNOR (AS AN INDIVIDUAL)),

WHERE ACT DONE RESULTS IN HARM/DETIMENT TO A LIFER, THEN THE ACT DONE IS UNLAWFULLY DONE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE ACT DONE WAS ACHIEVED BY BREACHING DUE PROCESS AND CIRCUMVENTING PROPER PROCEDURE, THEREFORE NEGLIGENT ACTION BY STATE GOVERNMENT (NEGLIGENCE DUE TO FAILING/NEGLECTING TO COMPLY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS), EFFECTING ILLEGAL ACTION TO ACHIEVE DESIRED AND INTENDED RESULT (WHICH WAS FOR LIFER TO BE REFUSED PAROLE). ALSO, WITH NO AUTHORITY TO SO ACT IN SAID MANNER (BY GOVERNOR, CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), THERE IS ALSO NO DISCRETION HELD BY THE GOVERNOR, CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO REJECT / ~~REFUSE~~ REFUSE OR EVEN APPROVE ~~THE~~ PAROLE APPLICATION DIRECTLY (AS THAT AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS VESTED ONLY IN THE PAROLE BOARD AND NO OTHER), AS LEGISLATION ONLY PERMITS THEIR RECEIPT OF THE PAROLE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION (TO GRANT PAROLE ~~TO THE~~), TO THEN CONSIDER, THEN DETERMINE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION/SOUNDNESS OF THE ~~PAROLE~~ PAROLE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION PROPER, AND THIS POSITION OF CONTENTION GAINS JUDICIAL WEIGHT FROM SELICK [64. (PARAS. 94, 117.)], WATSON [194. (PARA. 64. "FRAUD")], AND WATSON [194. (PARA. 133)].

182. 22. IF GOVERNMENTS (CH. II [3.]), REFUSAL (REJECTION), TO APPROVE PAROLE TO A LIFER, FROM 1-8-1944 [46.], AFTER PAROLE BOARD ALREADY 'RECOMMENDED PAROLE', IS NOT A POLITICAL DECISION (AS THAT WOULD BE AN IMPROPER ACT BY STATE GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNOR), THEN IT MUST BE A LEGAL DECISION, WHICH IS WHAT IS 'CLAIMED' BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING IN WATSON [194.]), IN WHICH CASE IT IS PURELY A LEGITIMATE LEGAL JUDGMENT MADE BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT (IN CABINET), AND PARTIED TO BY THE GOVERNOR, AGAINST THE LEGAL COMPETENCE OF THE PAROLE BOARD, THEREBY DETERMINING THAT THE PAROLE BOARD WAS PROFESSIONALLY INEPT, PROFESSIONALLY INCOMPETENT AND PROFESSIONALLY NEGLIGENT 'TO ARRIVE AT THEIR OFFICIAL DETERMINATION TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE TO A SPECIFIC LIFER PAROLE APPLICANT''. JUDICIAL REVIEW (CLCA s. 237), BY A JUDICIAL BODY (CLCA s. 237), OF A DECISION/ACTION OF A GOVERNMENT BODY (PAROLE BOARD), UNDERTAKEN/CONDUCTED BY CABINET, THEREBY VOIDING THE ACTUAL 'RECOMMENDATION WHICH THE BOARD DETERMINED',

WHICH MUST THEN ALSO MEAN (BY VOIDING BOARD'S 'RECOMMENDATION', AS IT SAID BOARD'S DETERMINATION IS EFFECTIVELY STILL PENDING), THAT THE PAROLE BOARD MUST STILL REACH ITS FORMAL DETERMINATION, SO 'DETERMINATION', IF IS TO 'RECOMMEND' PAROLE (AGAIN), IN COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS AND CORRECT PROCEDURE ([100. AND 101.]), CAN THEN BE FORWARDED TO GOVERNOR "FOR APPROVAL" ([100. AND 101.]). THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CABINET AND GOVERNOR (AS AN INDIVIDUAL), MAKE A 'LEGAL JUDGMENT' WHEN REFUSING SUCH LIFER PAROLE APPLICANTS, QUALIFIED EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT SUCH 'REFUSALS' ARE IN FACT ONLY POLITICAL DECISIONS/REFUSALS, AND ARE 'FRAUDULENT' IN THEIR CREATION (BY CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL). REFUSING TO ADHERE TO BOARD'S 'RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PAROLE TO A LIFER', THEREBY REJECTING PAROLE APPLICATION OUTRIGHT, IS A FRAUDULENT DECISION BOVING FROM FRAUDULENT CONSIDERATION (WATSON [194. (PARA. 64.)]).

183.

23. THE COURT WAS IN SERIOUS ERROR IN WATSON [194. (PARA. 112.)], WHEN IT STATED AS IF FACTUAL ~~THE~~ ^{THAT} THE 'GOVERNOR HAS WIDE/BROAD EXERCISE OF DISCRETION AND POWER ASSOCIATED WITH RECEIPT OF PAROLE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION' (FOR PAROLE FOR A LIFER PAROLE APPLICANT) ([194. (PARAS. 112, 80, 94, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103.)]). AS ABOVE HIGHLIGHTED, STATUTORY STIPULATIONS AFFIRMATIVELY LIMIT GOVERNOR'S JURISDICTION TO PAROLE BOARD'S 'DECISION' ONLY, NOT THE ACTUAL APPLICATION BY LIFER. IN FACT, THE GOVERNOR (AS AN INDIVIDUAL, AFTER RECEIPT OF ADVICE FROM CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL [29.]), DOES HAVE VERY NARROW SCOPE OF JURISDICTION, CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S CLAIM IN WATSON [194. (PARA. 80.)], WHEN DEALING WITH THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION, BY THE VERY SPECIFIC WORDING IN THE CSA, REGARDING 'BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION' ([100. AND 101.]), AND THE VERY OBVIOUS ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION OF 'THE LIFER'S PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER', THEREFORE, NOT ONLY IS THE JURISDICTION OF THE GOVERNOR AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL LEGISLATIVELY CONFINED, AND AS SUCH ALSO CONSTITUTIONALLY CONFINED (CH. II [3.]), TO JUST THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION, THEY ARE PROHIBITED FROM EXCEEDING THE NARROW SCOPE BY WORDED STIPULATIONS (DESCRIBING SPECIFICALLY THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT), ALREADY EXISTING WITHIN CSA, INCLUDING AT [112. ("ANY PROCEEDINGS UNDER THIS PART")],

AND QUITE SIGNIFICANTLY AT [113. ("ANY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE BOARD")]. A 'PAROLE APPLICATION BY LIFER', UPON RECEIPT OF BY THE PAROLE BOARD, IS THEREAFTER A MATTER/PROCEEDING BEFORE THE BOARD' ([110. AND 111.]), UNTIL SAID 'MATTER', THE APPLICATION FOR PAROLE (BY LIFER), IS CONCLUDED, WHICH MUST COMPLY WITH [107. AND 108.], AND WHICH CAN ONLY BE PERFORMED BY THE PAROLE BOARD, THEREBY CONCLUDING SAID 'MATTER BEFORE THE BOARD' ([112. AND 113.]). THE BOARD ALONE (FURTHER REINFORCED BY STATUTE WORDING AT [107. AND 108.]), MUST DECIDE ON PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, AS IS ALSO THE LEGISLATIVE INTENTION AS PARLIAMENT ITSELF PASSED. IF PARLIAMENT INTENDED GOVERNOR AND/OR CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO ACTUALLY HOLD VETO JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY OVER THE PAROLE BOARD (WHICH, I ARGUE, THE PAROLE BOARD, GOVERNOR AND CABINET HAVE ACTED AS IF PARLIAMENT HAD ALREADY GIVEN GOVERNOR AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL THAT SPECIFIC JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY, BUT THAT IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY ACCURATE, IT IS THEREFORE A FRAUDELENT AND ILLEGAL ACT FOR GOVERNOR AND CABINET/EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, TO PARTAKE IN THE CONSIDERATION THEN DETERMINATION OF PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER, WHICH IN FACT HAVING ALREADY BEEN DONE BY THE PAROLE BOARD), THEN PARLIAMENT IS REQUIRED TO 'POSITIVELY AND AFFIRMATIVELY' DESCRIBE IN CLEAR, AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND UNMISTAKABLE WORDS WHICH DIRECT THE PARLIAMENTARY INTENTION CLAIMED ([64. (PARAS. 93, 94, 117.)]). FOR THERE TO ACTIVELY EXIST IN LEGISLATION ([46.]), AN OPERATIONAL CHANGE IN THE PRIOR INTENTION OF PARLIAMENT (PRIOR TO 1-8-1994 [46.]), WHICH WAS 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE' ([123., 124., 125., 126., 127., 128. AND 139.]), THEN PARLIAMENT MUST STIPULATE WHO PARLIAMENT INTENDS TO HOLD SUCH JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY ([17.]). THE PARLIAMENT VESTED SUCH JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY WITH THE PAROLE BOARD, AND BY DELIBERATELY NOT GRANTING SUCH ~~THE~~ POWER AND ULTIMATE AUTHORITY, TO EITHER 'RECOMMEND' OR 'REFUSE' TO GRANT PAROLE TO A LIFER APPLICANT ([74., 112., 113., 107., 108., 100., 101. AND 103.]), TO ANY OTHER (SUCH AS GOVERNOR AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL), QUALIFIED AND REINFORCES THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY IN THE PAROLE BOARD. WHILST THE BOARD'S "RECOMMENDATION" TO GRANT PAROLE IS FIRST FORWARDED TO GOVERNOR, BEFORE FINALISATION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER ([100.]), SUCH CONSIDERATION BY THE

- GOVERNOR (E29.3), IS NOT THEN THE ENDING AUTHORITY FOR THE 'PAROLE APPLICATION PROPER' IF GOVERNOR (E29.3), DECIDES NOT TO APPROVE THE BOARD'S 'RECOMMENDATION', BECAUSE IT IS PARLIAMENTS INTENTION THAT SUCH GOVERNORS DECLINATION MUST THEN RETURN TO PAROLE BOARD FOR FINALISATION, AS STIPULATED BY CSA (E110., 111., 112. AND 113., THEN 107, 108. AND 109.3).
184. 24. CSA ss. 67(7A), 67(7B), 67(7C) [E102.3], 67(9)(C) [E108.3], 67(10) [E109.3], HAVE BEEN FRAUDULENTLY AMENDED INTO LEGISLATION, AND BREACH AIA [E28.3] IN THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFECT. [E16.3]
185. 25. CSA s. 67. (E44.3), IS SIGNIFILANTLY INCOMPLETE TOWARDS PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS, IT CLAIMS, AND OPERATES AS IF IT ALREADY HAS, CONSTITUTIONAL [E1.3] COMPLIANCE AUTHORITY TO EFFECT CERTAIN OPERATIONAL ACTIONS, BUT IN FACT VIOLATES GOVERNMENTS' (CH.II [E3.3]), AND PARLIAMENTS' (CH.I [E3.3]), APPOINTED
186. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY. EXAMPLE, [E97.3] 'NPP FIXED IN RESPECT OF PRISONERS SENTENCE', WHICH MEANS THE NPP FIXED BY THE SENTENCING COURT [E87.3], AND HAS NO RELEVANCE TO THE ILLEGALLY CREATED 'EXTENDED NPP' (CSA. s. 67(9)(C) [E107. AND 108.3]), OR 'ADMINISTRATIVELY INCREASED NPP' (CSA. s. 67(10) [E109.3]), NEITHER OF WHICH WERE LAWFULLY CREATED PURSUANT TO [E84., 45., 36., 35. ("SENTENCE" (C)), AND 38.3], YET ACCORDING TO THE PAROLE BOARD AND THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT (OPERATING UNDER CH.II [E3.3]), THEIR CREATED NEW NPP (WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED WITHOUT A CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT, WITHOUT SENTENCING ARGUMENT/SENTENCING SUBMISSIONS, WITHOUT SENTENCING/PRE-SENTENCING REPORT, WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OR INVOLVEMENT FROM OR BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (OR EVEN A PROSECUTOR), WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT OR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF OR FROM THE LIPER (DEFENDANT)), IS THEREAFTER AN OPERATIONALLY FUNCTIONAL NEW NPP AS IF IT CAME IMPOSED BY THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING COURT [E45.3], EXCEPT THAT NO LAWFULLY CREATED CONSTITUTIONAL [E1.3] INSTRUMENT WAS USED IN THE CREATED NEW (DCS CREATED), NON-PAROLE PERIOD [E45.3], AND THEREFORE MUST NOT HOLD ANY WEIGHT WITH ANY GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENT INCLUDING DCS, CRIMINAL COURTS, ETC.
187. ~~THE~~ THE PAROLE BOARD AND GOVERNMENT MARRY CSA s. 67 (9)(C) (E108.3) TO CSA s. 67(2), THEN EFFECT OPERATION OF CSA s. 67(1) AND CSA s. 67(2) (E97., 95.

AND 96.]), WHICH IS A FRAUDULENT ACTION BY STATE GOVERNMENT TO ILLEGALLY INCREASE COURT IMPOSED NPP, TO A DCS CREATED NEW NPP, AND USE FRAUDULENT LEGISLATION WHICH BREACHES [28.], AND VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), TO ADMINISTRATIVELY INCREASE WITH SERIOUS AND SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE AND HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES, INCLUDING CRIMINAL MIS-USE OF POSITION OF EMPLOYMENT AND POSITION OF AUTHORITY, AND ILLEGAL DETENTION (AFTER COURT IMPOSED NPP PLUS 30 DAYS APPROXIMATELY), ESPECIALLY FOR 'PRISONER A' TYPES LIKE ME WHO ALSO HAVE RIGHT OF AUTOMATIC PAROLE, AND ALL DONE WITHOUT USE OF THE SENTENCING ACT ([45.]), OR OF A SENTENCING COURT WHO IS THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENT AUTHORISED TO VARY/INCREASE THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF A LIFER (IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA). JUST BECAUSE GOVERNMENT THINKS (INCLUDING PAROLE BOARD), ^{IT} ~~IS~~ HAS CERTAIN POWERS THROUGH LEGISLATION OPERATION ([46.]), EVEN IF WHAT THEY CLAIM ^{AS AN} ~~THEIR~~ AUTHORITY DOESN'T EVEN EXIST IN CLEAR WORDS IN THE CSA, DOES NOT MEAN IT ACTUALLY EXISTS IN LAW, SUCH AS DESCRIBED IN THIS SUB-PARAGRAPH.

188. IF, INCLUDING FULL CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY ASSOCIATED/LINKED TO CSA. SS. 67(1), 67(2), 67(3), 67(9) AND 67(10), THE GOVERNMENT IS TO ACT IN A CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPLIANT MANNER, IN RELATION TO PAROLE BOARD'S 'DECISION TO REFUSE PAROLE TO A LIFER', THEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES MUST BE WRITTEN IN CLEAR WORDING IN THE CSA, INCLUDING SOME REMOVALS FROM CURRENT WORDING. AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT SHOULD EXIST IN CSA WORDING, AND ACCOUNTABLE DUE ~~THEIR~~ PROCESS:

189. 1.) CSA. s. 67(3) - 1st PAROLE APPLICATION IS SUBMITTED.
- 2.) CSA. s. 67(3A) - AMENDED ('... MUST BE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY (LEGAL MERIT), IN ANY INTENDED REFUSAL BY THE BOARD, WHERE SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY IS FOUNDED ON AND SUPPORTED BY 'QUALIFIED' DOCUMENT EVIDENCE, WHICH IS MEASURED TO COURT STANDARD.')
190. 3.) CSA. s. 67(4) - 1st. 'REFUSAL' BY BOARD [OF LIFERS ONLY] AND SUBSEQUENT ALSO.
191. s. 67(4)(D) - AMENDED ('THE REASONS FOR ITS REFUSAL;')
- AMENDMENT (EXPUNGE ALL OTHER WORDS)
192. * s. 67(4)(D)(i) - AMENDMENT ('PURSUANT TO S. 32(6) OF THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING ACT 1988, DPP/PAROLE BOARD IS APPLYING FOR

143. S. 67(4)(b)(ii) - AMENDMENT ('PRISONER WILL BE NOTIFIED IN WRITING BY THE COURT OF A HEARING DATE, WHICH WILL BE NO LESS THAN 30 DAYS AFTER COURT REGISTRY RECEIVES DPP/BOARD'S 'APPLICATION' FOR EXTENDING EXISTING FIXED NON-PAROLE PERIOD, AND DPP/BOARD'S 'APPLICATION' MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT REGISTRY WITHIN 7. CALENDAR DAYS OF BOARD'S 'REFUSAL';')
144. S. 67(4)(b)(iii) - AMENDMENT ('IF DPP/BOARD'S APPLICATION IS NOT SUBMITTED IN WRITTEN FORM ~~WITHIN~~ ^{IN} 7. CALENDAR DAYS OR LESS, FROM DATE OF THEIR 'REFUSAL', WHERE NO EXCUSE WILL BE PERMITTED IF NOT SUBMITTED WITHIN SAID 7. DAYS, THE 'REFUSAL' MUST BE AUTOMATICALLY REVERSED, BOARD'S DECISION MUST THEN BECOME TO 'RECOMMEND PAROLE' [FOR THE LIFER], EFFECTING CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT S. 67.(6), WHICH WILL THEREFORE ALLOW FOR DPP/BOARD'S 'APPLICATION' TO THE COURT REGISTRY TO BE WITHDRAWN, WITHOUT WASTING COURT'S TIME;')
145. S. 67(4)(b)(iv) - AMENDMENT ('LIFER MUST BE AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED LEGAL REPRESENTATION BY GOVERNMENT LEGAL AID COMMISSION, AND THE DPP/BOARD MUST NOTIFY THEM IN WRITING WITHIN 7. CALENDAR DAYS OF DATE OF BOARD'S 'REFUSAL', OF NAME, LOCATION, DOC. NUMBER, SENTENCING JUDGMENT No, COPY OF BOARD'S WRITTEN 'REFUSAL', RELATING TO SAID LIFER, AFTER WHICH THE LEGAL AID COMMISSION MUST ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH PRISONER, IN PERSON, WITHIN 10. CALENDAR DAYS OF DATE OF BOARD'S 'REFUSAL', TO INFORM PRISONER OF SAID REPRESENTATION AND AID FUNDING (IF REQUIRED), AND TO DETERMINE IF PRISONER SEEKS ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATION SUCH AS NON-IN-HOUSE COUNSEL, AND IF PRISONER IS SUFFICIENTLY FUNDED;')
146. S. 67(4)(b)(v) - AMENDMENT ('LEGAL AID COMMISSION MUST APPLY FUNDING RATES EQUAL TO Q.C. (QUEENS COUNSEL) FUNDING SCALE WHICH

THE LEGAL AID COMMISSION ALREADY ADOPTS, REGARDING THE PRISONERS' LEGAL AID FUNDING FOR SAID MATTER.'⁷)

197. s. 67(9)(c) - AMENDED ('SUBJECT TO SUBSECTION 67(4)(B) REASONS, THIS SUBSECTION MAY APPLY INDEPENDANTLY OR IN COMPANY WITH 67(4)(B)(i);'⁷)
198. s. 67(4)(c)(i) - AMENDMENT ('PURSUANT TO S. 33A. OF THE CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING ACT 1988, THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IS APPLYING FOR VACATION OF A NON-PAROLE PERIOD;'⁷)
199. s. 67(4)(c)(ii) - AMENDMENT ('PRISONER WILL BE NOTIFIED IN WRITING BY THE COURT OF A HEARING DATE, WHICH WILL BE NO LESS THAN 30 DAYS AFTER COURT REGISTRY RECEIVES ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S 'APPLICATION' FOR VACATION OF NON-PAROLE PERIOD, AND SAID 'APPLICATION' MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT REGISTRY WITHIN 7. CALENDER DAYS OF BOARD'S 'REFUSAL';'⁷)
200. s. 67(4)(c)(iii) - AMENDMENT ('REPEAT EFFECT AND ACTION DESCRIBED IN 67(4)(B)(iii);'⁷)
201. s. 67(4)(c)(iv) - AMENDMENT ('REPEAT EFFECT AND ACTION DESCRIBED IN 67(4)(B)(iv);'⁷)
202. s. 67(4)(c)(v) - AMENDMENT ('REPEAT EFFECT AND ACTION DESCRIBED IN 67(4)(B)(v).'⁷)
203. s. 67(4)(d) - AMENDMENT ('IT IS INTENDED THAT THE PRISONER SHALL BE AFFORDED EXPEDITED HEARINGS BY THE COURT, WHERE SUCH APPLICATION/S SHALL BE PROPERLY DETERMINED, THOUGH SO AS NOT TO DISADVANTAGE THE PRISONER, PRISONER MAY REQUEST OF THE COURT A SHORT DELAY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREPARING REASONABLE CHALLENGE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S 'APPLICATION/S'.⁷)
204. s. 67(9)(e) - AMENDMENT ('FOLLOWING APPLICATION/S BY DPP/PAROLE BOARD (SENTENCING ACT S. 32), OR ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SENTENCING ACT S. 33A.), AND PRIOR TO DELIVERY OF

- SENTENCING COURT'S JUDGMENT, SAID APPLICATION/S MAY BE WITHDRAWN BY THE APPLICANT FOR ANY REASON, AND SUCH REASON MUST BE LEGITIMATE AND FAIR TO THE PRISONER, ENSURING THE APPLICANT/S DID NOT INTEND TO ABUSE THE APPLICATION PROCESS FOR IMPROPER PURPOSES;')
105. s. 67(4)(E)(i) - AMENDMENT ('WHERE APPLICATION IS WITHDRAWN BY APPLICANT, THE ORIGINAL REFUSAL BY THE PAROLE BOARD (CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT S. 67(4)), IS VOIDED AND ~~PAROLE BOARD~~ ^{BOARD} MUST CONSEQUENTIALLY REVERSE ITS PRIOR DETERMINATION, AND MUST THEN RECOMMEND PAROLE BE GRANTED TO PRISONER, EFFECTING CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT S. 67(6);')
206. s. 67(4)(F) - AMENDMENT ('SUBSEQUENT TO APPLICATION/S BY DPP/PAROLE BOARD AND/OR ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SENTENCING ACT ~~S. 32~~ S. 32 AND/OR S. 33A), AND SENTENCING COURT'S JUDGMENT BEING DELIVERED, THE GOVERNMENT MUST ACCEPT COURT'S JUDGMENT WITHOUT APPEALING JUDGMENT, IF COURT REJECTS APPLICATION/S AND FINDS IN FAVOUR OF PRISONER;')
207. s. 67(9)(A)(i) - AMENDMENT ('IF SENTENCING COURT ACCEPTS APPLICATION/S BY DPP/PAROLE BOARD OR ATTORNEY-GENERAL, PRISONER MUST BE AFFORDED ALL CURRENT SENTENCING APPEAL RIGHTS, WITH LEGAL AID COMMISSION FUNDING AUTOMATICALLY APPROVED FOR PRISONER IF FINANCIAL MERIT TEST DETERMINES INSUFFICIENT FUNDS AVAILABLE TO PRISONER, TO FUND THEIR JUDGMENT APPEAL;')
208. s. 67(4)(F)(ii) - AMENDMENT ('WHERE SENTENCING COURT IMPOSES AN EXTENDED NON-PAROLE, ANY SUCH NEW NPP MUST NOT EQUATE TO AN EFFECTIVE INCREASE EXCEEDING 12 MONTHS FROM THE DATE DPP/PAROLE BOARD APPLICATION (TO EXTEND NPP), IS LODGED WITH THE COURT REGISTRY [THIS DATE SERVES

- TO REPLACE CSA s. 67(4)(c), WHERE THE COURT HAS DETERMINED NPP DATE, NOT THE PAROLE BOARD;')
209. s. 67(4)(f)(iii) - AMENDMENT ('WHERE SENTENCING COURT IMPOSES EXTENDED NPP, FOLLOWING SENTENCING ACT S. 32 APPLICATION, ANY REAPPLICATION FOR PAROLE MUST BE SUBMITTED TO PAROLE BOARD NO ~~LESS~~ ^{MORE} THAN 6 MONTHS PRIOR TO NEW NPP, IN ACCORDANCE WITH CSA s. 67(3);')
210. s. 67(4)(f)(iv) - AMENDMENT ('FOLLOWING COURT IMPOSING AN EXTENDED NPP, SUBSEQUENT TO SENTENCING ACT S. 32 APPLICATION, THE BOARD MAY (IF GOOD REASONS EXIST FOR DOING SO), RECEIVE REAPPLICATION FOR PAROLE EARLIER ~~THAN~~ THAN 6 MONTHS PRIOR TO DATE OF NEW NON-PAROLE PERIOD
211. s. 67(9) - AMEND ('THE BOARD MUST, NOT MORE THAN 7. CALENDER DAYS AFTER DATE OF 'REFUSAL' TO GRANT/RECOMMEND PAROLE, NOTIFY PRISONER IN WRITING OF BOARD'S, DPP'S AND/OR ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S INTENTIONS, AND SUCH WRITTEN NOTIFICATION TO PRISONER MUST BE VIA AVAILABLE DELIVERY SERVICE WHICH PROVIDES SPEEDIEST ISSUING TO PRISONER, INCLUDING FACSIMILE/REGISTERED MAIL SERVICE;')
212. 4) CSA. s. 67(10) - AMEND (THIS SUB-SECTION IS AMENDED INTO CSA ~~s.~~ s. 67(9)(f) ABOVE DESCRIBED.)

AND

213. 5) CSA. s. 67(7A) - AMEND ('IF THE GOVERNOR DOES NOT APPROVE THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE OF PRISONER SERVING LIFE SENTENCE, THE BOARD'S RECOMMENDATION IN-PROCESS, IS AUTOMATICALLY SUSPENDED, AND THE GOVERNOR MUST INFORM THE BOARD WITHIN 7. CALENDER DAYS, OF SUCH